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A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS IN PRODUCT LIABILITY SUITS
Francis B. Burch, Jr.t
The requirements of the statutes of limitations applicable to
each theory of recovery that might provide the basis for a
product liability suit are outlined in this article. Differences
among these statutes are highlighted and the author identifies
the problems that may result from a multi-count declaration
when a different statute of limitations applies to each count.
It can truthfully be said that there are as many viable concepts for
recovery in the product liability field1 as there are injury-producing
occurrences. In virtually every case, however, the theories employed
can normally be classified under one of the following four potential
causes of action: common law negligence, breach of the warranties
under the Uniform Commercial Code, fraud and strict liability in tort.
In each cause of action, a primary concern to both plaintiff and
defendant is the statute of limitations.
At the outset, it should be noted that one basic rationale underlies
most statutes of limitations. That rationale has been described as
follows:
The primary consideration... is undoubtedly one of fairness
to the defendant. There comes a time when he ought to be
secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been
wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be
called on to resist a claim when "evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." 2
Ideally, a statute of limitations represents a healthy compromise
between the interest of insuring a diligent plaintiff his or her day in
court and the interest of protecting a defendant against stale claims.3
tA.B., 1970, Georgetown University; J.D., 1974, University of Maryland; Associate, Piper
and Marbury, Baltimore, Maryland; Member of the Maryland Bar.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Clinton Kelly, University of
Baltimore Law Review staff.
1. While the term "product liability" might be literally understood to embrace all actions
involving defective products, including those in which only a commercial loss is alleged,
the term as here employed refers only to those cases in which an allegedly defective
product results in personal injury.
2. Developments in the Law-Statute of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950)
(footnotes omitted) (quoted in Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 297, 257 A.2d 421,
426 (1969).
3. Ryser v. Gatchel, 151 Ind. App. 62, 278 N.E.2d 320, 324 (1972).
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The terms of this compromise may vary significantly depending upon
the nature of the cause of action involved. The result is that the statute
of limitations for one cause of action may differ from that applicable to
another cause of action.
In a typical product liability suit, the plaintiff normally brings a
multi-count declaration that incorporates as many theories as the facts
of his particular case will accommodate. Since the statute of limitations
might differ for each theory, a thorough understanding of the different
limitation periods and the time when each begins to run is essential to a
plaintiff who wishes to preserve his option to proceed on different
theories.4 A working knowledge of the statutes of limitations is equally
essential to a defendant in that it will enable him to recognize when his
opponent's otherwise viable remedies are barred.
This article will discuss the periods of limitations applicable to the
theories most commonly employed in product liability litigation,
analyze problems commonly encountered in their application, and
comment briefly on the manner in which some of these common
problems have been handled by the courts. While the focus will be on
Maryland law, decisions from other jurisdictions and the authorities will
also be examined, particularly as they bear on points for which there is
no Maryland precedent.
NEGLIGENCE
The statute of limitations for an action sounding in negligence is
provided by Section 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which states:
A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the
date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a
different period of time within which an action shall be
commenced.'
As the statute indicates, the period expires three years from the date
when the cause of action accrues. Although limitations statutes in some
4. A plaintiff who anticipates that one theory will be sufficient for his use and who
consequently neglects to insure that other remedies are not barred may be in for a
surprise. For example, one who expects to proceed on a theory of breach of warranty
might subsequently find his warranty remedy barred if he has failed to give the defendant
the timely notice of the alleged breach of warranty required by MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L.
Art., § 2-607(3)(a) (1975). Likewise, one who pursues a remedy on a theory of fraud
because of the possibility of recovering punitive damages may discover that he is unable to
meet the vigorous burden of proof for recovery in fraud. In both cases, the plaintiff will
be without any remedy if he has failed to comply with the statutes of limitations
applicable to other potential theories of recovery.
5. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 5-101 (1974). The predecessor of this statute,
Law of May 7, 1951, ch. 679, § 1, [1951] Laws of Md. 1987 has been held to govern
negligence actions. Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. 83, 88, 148 A.2d 438, 440 (1959).
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states have expressly fixed the time of accrual of a cause of action in
negligence, 6 there is no such statute in Maryland. The question of when
a cause of action accrues in a particular case is a question of law.7 While
no Maryland case has expressly fixed the time of accrual of a cause of
action in negligence in a product liability context,8 the general rule is
that the cause of action accrues at the time of injury,9 notwithstanding
the fact that the negligent act or omission occurred sometime before
6. In Connecticut, for example, the applicable statute of limitations formerly read as
follows:
No action to recover damages for injury to the person ... shall be brought but
within one year from the date of the act or omission complained of. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 8324 (1949).
In Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (applying
Connecticut law), this statute was construed to mean that an action against the
manufacturer of a defective rifle began to run at the time of sale to a dealer although the
plaintiff was not injured until four years later. In Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
144 Conn. 170, 175, 127 A.2d 814, 816 (1956), a Connecticut appellate court adopted
the Dincher holding in a similar case. The court noted that the statute did not fix the
commencement of the limitations on the date when the injury occurs but, instead, on the
date of the act complained of, notwithstanding the fact that the commission of the act
would not have been actionable in the absence of some injury.
Under a Tennessee statute similar to the Connecticut statute quoted above, a cause of
action for negligence producing injury was deemed to accrue on the date of the sale of the
product by the defendant even where the plaintiff was not the purchaser. Jackson v.
General Motors Corp., 223 Tenn. 12, 14-15, 441 S.W.2d 482, 483 (1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 942 (1969). However, in 1972, an amendment to this statute expressly fixed the
date of accrual for personal injury actions as the date of the injury. TENN. COnE ANN. tit.
28, § 304 (1972). Subsequently, in McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 2 CCH
PROD. LIAB. REP. 7452 (Tenn. 1975), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a cause of
action for personal injuries accrues .on the date when the injury occurs or is discovered
notwithstanding the fact that the injury occurred before the effective date of the 1972
amendment.
7. Jones v. Sugar, 18 Md. App. 99, 105, 305 A.2d 219, 223 (1973).
8. Indeed, there is no Maryland case which expressly fixes the time of accrual of a cause of
action in negligence in any context except malpractice. As the latter part of this article
indicates, a cause of action for malpractice normally accrues when the wrong was or
should have been discovered.
In Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 94, 253 A.2d 904, 907 (1969), a medical
malpractice case, the court of appeals described the "discovery rule" as a departure from
the general rule that the statute begins to run at the time of the commission of the
wrongful act. A literal application of the general rule to many personal injury actions
grounded in negligence, however, would prove troublesome. Particularly in product
liability litigation, the commission of a wrongful act (e.g. negligent manufacture) and the
occurrence of harm are not simultaneous. In such cases, limitations on any cause of action
against the wrongdoer would begin to run (and perhaps expire) before any injury was
sustained. However, in Emerson v. Gaither, 103 Md. 564, 582, 64 A. 26, 32 (1906) in
which a bank receiver brought suit against its directors for losses resulting from unlawful
loans, the court of appeals cited with approval this language from 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law, which might apply by analogy:
When the act complained of might or might not be injurious, and the plaintiff's right
of action must depend upon its proving injurious [as in negligence actions], the
cause of action cannot be considered as accruing until the injury has developed, and
until then the statute does not begin to run.
This language was also quoted by the U.S. District Court for Maryland in a case involving
the negligence of a bank in applying funds to the payment of a loan. Smith v. Sherwood,
308 F. Supp. 895, 898 (1970). But see note 64, infra.
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the accident or occurrence producing the injury."° This is logical since
an essential element of any action based on a negligence theory is injury
proximately resulting from some act or omission."
It should be noted that it is the date of the initial injury that is
relevant for purposes of determining the date of accrual of a cause of
action in most jurisdictions that follow the general rule that the date of
accrual is the date of injury. The mere fact that all consequential
damage is either not incurred or not discovered until a later time does
not normally postpone the running of the statute of limitations. 2
For example, in Cheney v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc. ,"3 a consumer
attempted to recover in negligence after she allegedly suffered a
pulmonary embolism as the result of taking a drug manufactured by the
defendant. The complaint indicated that before she suffered the
embolism, the plaintiff was hospitalized because of side effects from
taking the drug. The limitations period was held to run from the date of
the initial hospitalization instead of the date when the embolism
developed, and the plaintiff's action was barred because she failed to
file suit within the required time.
Some courts, on the other hand, take the position that the statute of
limitations does not start to run until the maturation of harm.' 4 The
Maryland Court of Appeals, however, has expressly rejected this
doctrine on a number of occasions.'" Thus, it is probably safe to
conclude that in Maryland a product liability action grounded in
negligence would be deemed to accrue on the date of the injury caused
by the alleged defect and not at some earlier time, and that the date of
the injury refers to the date on which the first "trivial injuries" 16
occur, notwithstanding the fact that more serious or other types of
injury flowing from the same act or omission might develop at a later
time.
9. Fixing the time of injury can also prove to be troublesome. A consumer who purchases a
defective product arguably suffers some legally cognizable harm on the date of purchase.
Thus, it might be argued that any cause of action he possesses against the defendant
accrues on the date of purchase notwithstanding the fact that personal injury results at a
later time. This reasoning, applicable only to the purchaser, has more theoretical than
practical appeal.
10. 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LABsrrY § 39.01[2] (1975) [hereinafter cited
as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN ].
11. Garbis v. Apatoff, 192 Md. 12, 16-17, 63 A.2d 307, 309 (1949).
12. E.g., Cheney v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 386, 387 (D. Ga. 1967).
13. Id.
14. E.g., Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261, 262 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968).
15. Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 294, 257 A.2d 421, 424 (1969); Mattingly v.
Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 95-96, 253 A.2d 904, 908 (1969). These cases did not involve
product liability.
16. Southern Md. Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 203 F. Supp. 449,452 (D. Md. 1962).
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BREACH OF WARRANTY
In Maryland, actions for breach of warranty are governed by this
state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to
as the "UCC") which is found in the Commercial Law Article of the
Maryland Annotated Code. Section 2-275 of that Article provides in
part:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has
accrued."
The majority view is that these limitations provisions apply to all
actions brought for breach of a UCC warranty,' 8 including actions for
personal injury. 19 The only circumstance in which the UCC limita-
tions period has been held inapplicable occurred when a general statute
of limitations specifically applied to all personal injury actions,
regardless of the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff.2"
Although the Maryland courts have not ruled on the issue, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the limitations provisions set
forth in the UCC govern all warranty actions brought pursuant to that
Act, including personal injury actions. First, Section 2-715 of the UCC
expressly provides that consequential damages recoverable in connec-
tion with a breach of warranty include personal injury proximately
caused by the breach. 2' Secondly, the four-year period set forth in
17. MD. ANN. CODE. Comm. L. Art., § 2-725(1) (1975).
18. The warranties created by the UCC are contained in MD. ANN. CODE. Comm. L. Art.,
§ 2-313 (express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sample), § 2-314
(implied warranty, merchantability, usage of trade) and § 2-315 (implied warranty,
fitness for particular use) (1975).
19. E.g., Reid v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 2 CCH PRoD. LIAB. REP. 7413, at 13,772
(6th Cir. Mar. 21, 1975) (applying Michigan law); Nichols v. Eli Lilly Co., 2 CCH PROD.
LIAB. REP. 6995, at 12,112 (10th Cir. 1973) (applying Okla. law) (expressly rejecting
the view that the gravamen of the cause of action rather than the wording of the
complaint determines the applicable limitations period); Stanford v. Lesco Associates,
Inc., 10 UCC REP. SERv. 812, 813-14 (D.D.C. 1972); Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 339 F.
Supp. 1385, 1387 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Sinka v. Northern Commercial Co., 491 P.2d 116,
118 (Alas. 1971); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 275, 512 P.2d 776,
777 (1973).
20. E.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, 63 N.J. 130, 153-56, 305 A.2d 412, 420-26 (1973). In
Heavner, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a truck driver's action for personal
injuries suffered when a tire blew out on his rig was barred by New Jersey's two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury actions, notwithstanding the fact that the
plaintiff pleaded his cause of action, inter alia, in breach of warranty. The court held that
the nature of the damage rather than the form in which it was pleaded determines which
statute of limitations (personal injury or UCC) would apply. It should be noted,
however, that the personal injury statute under consideration in Heavner was broad and
apparently all-encompassing. The statute states in part:
Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect
or default of any person ... shall be commenced within 2 years next after [it
accrues]. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 2 A:4-2 (1952).
21. MD. ANN. CODE. Comm. L. Art., § 2-715(2)(b) (1975).
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Section 2-725 of the UCC nowhere indicates that its application is to be
restricted to cases involving commercial loss only. Additionally, there is
no statute of limitations in Maryland which purports to apply across
the board to all personal injury actions. Indeed, the only limitations
statute other than that contained in the UCC which is even conceivably
applicable to a personal injury claim based on a breach of warranty is
the general limitations statute contained in Section 5-101 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Act.2 2 That Section expressly states that it
does not apply when another provision of the Code provides a different
period of time within which an action shall be commenced. Thus, a
literal reading of the UCC provision and Section 5-101 compels the
conclusion that the four-year period in the Maryland version of the
UCC applies to all warranty actions, even those involving personal
injury. 2 3
A more troublesome problem concerns the date when a cause of
action for breach of warranty accrues. Paragraph two of Section 2-725
of the Maryland version of the UCC provides:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless
of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A
breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made,
except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future
performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must
await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues
when the breach is or should have been discovered.24
These express dictates of the UCC have been given effect apparently
without exception 2 5-despite the fact that in some cases they lead to
the apparently anomalous result that a plaintiff's cause of action is
barred before he has even suffered the injury of which he complains. 26
22. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 5-101 (1974).
23. In Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 277, 512 P.2d 776, 778 (1973), the
Supreme Court of Oregon construed statutory provisions internally identical to the
relevant Maryland statutes and concluded that the limitations period in the UCC applies
to all breach of warranty actions.
24. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. Law Art., § 2-725 (1975).
25. Weinstein v. General Motors Corp., 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 7396, at 13,719 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 1975); General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 516 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Ark.
1974); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 226 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973); Hoffman
v. A.B. Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Stanford v. Lesco
Associates, Inc. 10 UCC REP. SERv. 812 (D.D.C. 1972); Thalrose v. General Motors
Corp., 8 UCC REP. SER.1 257, 1258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd., 41 App. Div. 2d 906,
343 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1973).
26. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 516 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Ark. 1974); Hoffman v. A.B.
Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385, 1387 (M.D. Pa. 1972). While there are some cases
holding that a cause of action for breach of warranty involving personal injury does not
accrue until the date of the injury, none of these cases appears to involve application of
the UCC. E.g., Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890,
895 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (applying California statutes); Metal Structures Corp. v. Plains
Textiles, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93, 99 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1971) (sale before effective date of
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In General Motors v. Tate,27 for example, an automobile warranty
claim was held barred more than two years before the injury occurred.
The plaintiff had purchased an allegedly defective second-hand auto-
mobile more than four years after the first retail sale. More than two
years after the plaintiff had acquired the used car, it was involved in an
accident allegedly caused by a manufacturing defect. After ruling that
the four-year limitations period ran from the date of the first retail sale,
and not the date of the sale to the second-hand purchaser, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas held that the plaintiff's warranty action was barred
not only before the accident occurred but before the plaintiff came
into possession of the allegedly defective product.
While there have been some mutterings about the "obvious unfair-
ness" 28 of this result, close scrutiny discloses that it is not so
inequitable as might appear. First, a plaintiff whose remedies for breach
of warranty are barred will normally be able to proceed in negligence
or, perhaps, strict liability, since the remedies provided in the UCC are
in addition to any other common law or statutory remedies available to
an injured party.2 9
Secondly, the elements of proof in a UCC breach of warranty action
are less burdensome than those required for negligence. An essential
element for a cause of action in negligence is proof that the defendant's
lack of reasonable care caused the injury. 3' However, a plaintiff alleging
breach of warranty need prove only the existence of a warranty, that
the product did not conform to the warranty and that it proximately
caused injury.3' The time of accrual of the UCC breach of warranty
action represents a considered judgment that the seller's exposure to
this form of absolute liability should be limited to a definite period of
four years after he tenders the goods in question.32 The statute of
limitations contained in the UCC constitutes an integral part of the risk
apportioning scheme created by that statute.33
It is important to note that the cause of action accrues on the date of
sale regardless of whether the plaintiff knew or should have known of
UCC); Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183, 184 (D. Mont. 1970);
Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So. 2d 331, 333 (Fla. 1969); Caudill v. Wise
Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 12, 168 S.E.2d 257,259 (1969).
27. 516 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Ark. 1974).
28. E.g. , 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN. supra note 6, § 40.01(2), at 12-25.
29. MD. ANN. CODE. Comm. L. Art., § 1-103 (1975); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266
Ore. 273, 277-78, 512 P.2d 776, 778-79 (1973).
30. Livingston v. Stewart & Co., 194 Md. 155, 159, 69 A.2d 900, 901 (1949).
31. Sheeskin v. Giant Foods, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 620-21, 318 A.2d 874, 880 (1974),
aff'd, 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 555,
309 N.E.2d 550, 552 (1974).
32. See Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 278, 512 P.2d 776, 779 (1973);
Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 553, 309 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1974); W.
HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.5202
(1964).
33. See Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 554, 309 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1974).
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the existence of the breach.3 4 The only exception to this rule occurs
when a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the
goods.35 In that case, the cause of action accures when the plaintiff
discovered or should have discovered the breach. 6
This exception has been construed narrowly. Only when the
warranty makes express reference to the performance of the goods on
the happening of some future event or at some postponed time will it
fall within the parameters of this exception. Implied warranties are, by
definition, excluded from the exception."' Even those warranties
expressed in terms of the ability of the product to withstand use for a
period of years have uniformly been held to relate to the present
condition or fitness of the product and not to "explicitly extend to
future performance of the goods."
38
For example, in Thalrose v. General Motors Corp., the New York
Supreme Court held the warranties given in connection with the sale of
a new automobile not to relate to future performance:
The warrants granted with respect to automobiles are not
prospective in nature, even though they represent that the car
will work well for two or five years. That merely constitutes a
representation of the present condition of the product and that
it will be capable of enduring use for that period of time.40
In Binkley Co. v. Teledine Mid-America Corp. 4  an express
warranty that welding equipment would be capable of welding 1000
feet per fifty-minute hour was held not to explicitly extend to future
performance. The court recognized in other decisions "a judicial
34. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-725(2) (1975).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. An implied warranty, by definition, does not explicitly extend to future performance.
Any reference which an implied warranty makes to the prospective operation is implicit.
For this reason, the Arkansas Supreme Court held in General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 516
S.W.2d 602, 606 (Ark. 1974), that an implied warranty of merchantibility did not
explicitly extend to future performance. For other cases similarly denying this effect to
implied warranties, see Everhardt v. Rich's, Inc., 128 Ga. 319, 321, 196 S.E.2d 475, 476
(1973); Ibach v. Grant Donaldson Services, Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 39, 44, 326 N.Y.S.2d
720, 725 (1971); Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing, Co., 417 Pa. 107, 113, 207 A.2d 823, 826
(1965).
38. Thalrose v. General Motors Corp., 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1257, 1258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971),
aff'd, 41 App. Div. 2d 906, 343 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1973). But see Rempe v. General Electric
Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 160, 254 A.2d 577 (1969), in which the Connecticut Superior
Court stated in dictum that a lifetime guarantee given with a garbage disposal unit
extends to future performance. Messers White and Summers concur with the Connecticut
Court's conclusion. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-8, at 342
(1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
39. 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 41 App. Div. 2d 906, 343 N.Y.S. 2d
303 (1973).
40. Id. at 1258.
41. 333 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972).
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reluctance to infer from the language of express warranties terms of
prospective operation that are not clearly stated." 2
Similarly, a guarantee to correct any defect in material or workman-
ship in gasoline engines for three months from the sale was determined
not to be a warranty of future performance in Matlack, Inc. v. Butler
Manufacturing Co.43
The type of warranty which does explicitly extend to future
performance of the goods is illustrated by Perry v. Augustine.4 4 The
warranty was that a heating system installed in the summer would heat
the defendant's residence to 750 when the temperature outside was
minus 250. The court reasoned that since the warranty related to what
the system (sold and delivered in the summer) would do in the future
(the winter, when subzero conditions would first occur) a breach of the
warranty would have to await future events. Accordingly, a cause of
action did not accrue until the breach was discovered.' s
Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc.,46 presents the most
interesting example of a warranty which has been held to extend to
future performance. In 1958, plaintiff purchased from a retailer a
casket manufactured by the defendant. The defendant's "certificate of
assurance" accompanied the goods: "We hereby certify that this vault is
free from material defects or faulty workmanship and will give
satisfactory service at all times." 7 In 1970, when the casket was
disenterred for reburial elsewhere, it was discovered that the casket and
its contents had been damaged by leakage, and the New York Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff's cause of action for breach of warranty
accrued upon discovery of the leakage and damage in 1970, twelve
years after the purchase, because "defendant's warranty explicitly
extended to future performance.""
While it is not difficult to conceive of warranties that explicitly
42. Id. at 1186.
43. 253 F. Supp. 972, 976 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
44. 37 Pa. D.&C.2d 416 (C.P. 1965).
45. Id. at 418. Perry v. Augustine has been criticized for its circuitous rationale. The court
held that because the breach, practically speaking, could not be discovered until the
future, the warranty therefore explicitly extended to future performance, and thus the
cause of action did not accrue until discovery. Under the exception in Section 2-725(2) a
cause of action accrues upon discovery of the breach if the Warranty explicitly extends
to future performance. WHITE & SUMMERS. supra note 38, at 342.
46. 42 App. Div. 2d 573, 344 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1973).
47. Id. at 573, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
48. Id. at 574, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 103. In buttressing the rationale, the court stated:
Moreover, the very nature of the product implies performance over an extended
period of time. Id.
As noted at p. 30 & note 37 supra, Section 2-725(2) leaves no room for implication of
extension of warranties to future performance. It also should be noted that in Mittasch,
the New York Supreme Court ignored a contrary, and apparently binding holding of the
New York Court of Appeals on the same point in Citizens Utilities Co. v. American
Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 415, 184 N.E.2d 171, 173, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197
(1962) (sale before effective date of UCC in New York). Thus, it is doubtful that
Mittasch represents the law of New York on this question.
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extend to future performance, in practice they are the exception rather
than the rule. Thus, this distinction should be kept in mind: in
negligence actions, the date of injury is the critical date in determining
the limitations period, while in warranty actions the critical date is the
date of tender of delivery to the first retail consumer, unless the
warranty falls within the future performance exception.
Finally, it should be noted that the buyer's cause of action, if any,
against those other than the retailer who are in the distributive chain
also accrues upon tender of delivery of the product to him, although
the transaction involving these potential defendants occurred prior to
delivery.4 9
FRAUD
The three-year limitations period set forth in Section 5-101 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of
Maryland governs actions in fraud"°  as well as negligence." The
question of when a cause of action for common law fraud accrues,
however, has long troubled the courts. Early cases held that a cause of
action to recover damages for fraud ordinarily accrues, and the statute
of limitations begins to run, when the fraud is successfully consum-
mated. 2 However, the rule was qualified by an exception, recognized
either by decision 3 or statute, 4 that where the defendant fraudulently
49. For the purposes of the warranty provisions of the UCC, "'seller' includes the
manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler, or other middleman or the retailer." MD.
ANN. CODE. Comm. L. Art., § 2-314(1)(a) (1975). Compare this result with the old
minority rule that a cause of action in negligence accrues when the defendant introduces
the defective goods into the market. For example, in Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198
F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (construing a Connecticut statute), the plaintiff's cause of
action in negligence against the manufacturer was held to have accrued on the date of
sale to the retailer.
The rules applicable to the accrual of a buyer's cause of action similarly govern
warranty actions brought by third party beneficiaries pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE.
Comm. L. Art., § 2-318 (1975). Under this Section, a "seller's" warranty extends to
members and guests of the buyer's household, as well as others who "it is reasonable to
expect... may use, consume or be affected by the goods .... "Id.
50. See Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 143 (D. Md. 1968), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 412 F.2d 571 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970) (construed
predecessor, Law of May 7, 1951, ch. 679 § 1, [1951] Laws of Md. 1987). In those
states where there is a limitations period specifically applicable to all actions for personal
injury which differs from the period covering actions for fraud or deceit, it could be
argued that the period prescribed for fraud generally is inapplicable. See page 27 & note
20 supra.
51. Page 24 & note 5 supra.
52. American Indemnity Co. v. Ernst & Ernst, 106 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Nelson v. Petterson, 229 Ill. 240, 247-48, 82 N.E. 229, 231 (1907); Smith v. Middle
States Utilities Co. of Delaware, 224 Iowa 651, 275 N.W. 158, 166 (1937), rev'd on
other grounds after remand, 228 Iowa 686, 293 N.W. 59 (1940); Dunn v. Dent, 169
Miss. 574, 153 So. 798 (1934); Rice v. White, 9 Va. Rep. Ann. (4 Leigh) 1006, 1008
(1833). See also Wear v. Skinner, 46 Md. 257, 265 (1877).
53. E.g., Rice v. White, 9 Va. Rep. Ann. (4 Leigh) 1006, 1008 (1833).
54. E.g., American Idemnity Co. v. Ernst & Ernst, 106 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); Dunn v. Dent, 169 Miss. 574, 153 So. 798 (1934).
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conceals the plaintiff's cause of action, the statute does not begin to
run until discovery of the fraud. Section 5-203 of the Courts and the
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland
codifies this exception:
If a party is kept in ignorance of a cause of action by the
fraud of an adverse party, the cause of action shall be deemed
to accrue at the time when the party discovered, or by the
exercise of ordinary diligence should have discovered the
fraud.55
In Wear v. Skinner, 6 the Maryland Court of Appeals, held that the
predecessor of this statute 1 did not require a plaintiff to prove that
the defendant had committed a fraud distinct from and independent of
the original fraud, for the purpose of keeping the plaintiff in ignorance
of his cause of action.5 8 Rather, it was held that:
Where a party has been injured by the fraud of another, and
such fraud is concealed, or is of such character as to conceal
itself, whereby the injured party remains in ignorance of it
without any fault or want of diligence on his part the bar of the
statute does not begin to run, until the fraud is discovered,
though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part
of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the
knowledge of the other party.5 9
Later cases demonstrate the continuing vitality of the Wear hold-
ing.60 With the caveat that the party alleging fraudulent concealment
of his cause of action has the burden of proof,6 ' the effect of
Section 5-203 is that a cause of action for fraud will be deemed to
accrue at the time when the party discovered or should have discovered
the fraud.
STRICT LIABILITY
To date, the doctrine of strict liability in tort6 2 has not been
incorporated into the common law of Maryland. In every case in which
55. MD. ANN. CODE. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 5-203 (1974).
56. 46 Md. 257 (1877).
57. Law of March 30, 1868, ch. 357, § 1, [ 1868] Laws of Md. 646.
58. 46 Md. at 267.
59. Id. at 265.
60. E.g., Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548, 555, 187 A.2d 880, 884 (1963). See also Piper v.
Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 317, 113 A.2d 919, 923 (1955). Both of these cases were decided
under Law of March 30, 1868, ch. 357, § 1, [1868] Laws of Md. 646, predecessor to
§ 5-203.
61. Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 319, 113 A.2d 919, 924 (1955).
62. The doctrine of strict liability in tort derives from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965), which provides:
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the court of appeals has been asked to adopt strict liability, that court
has determined either that the facts6 3 or the theory of the particular
case did not warrant application of the doctrine.64 However, while
strict liability has not been adopted in this state, neither has it been
expressly rejected.65
In view of the burgeoning popularlity of the doctrine in other
jurisdictions,6 6 strict liability must be recognized as a potentially viable
theory upon which to bring a product liability action in Maryland.
Thus, it is appropriate to attempt to anticipate which statute of
limitations would be held applicable to an action for strict liability and
how that limitations period might be applied.
There has been some confusion over the proper statute of limitations
to be applied in an action for strict liability. 67 The dispute involves
whether the general tort limitations period should be applied, as
opposed to the limitations period applicable to actions for breach of
contract or breach of warranty.68
Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 69 is popularly viewed as the
seminal case to hold that the limitations period applicable to an action
in strict liability is the period prescribed for warranty actions. 70
However, a cursory reading of the Mendel opinion discloses that it
involved an action for breach of warranty and not strict liability in tort.
The defendant moved to dismiss the warranty counts in a multi-count
declaration on the ground that the limitations period had expired. The
plaintiffs sought to characterize their warranty allegations as sounding
in tort and argued that the tort limitations period be held applicable
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
the product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
63. E.g., Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 77, 285 A.2d 607,611 (1972); Myers v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 297, 252 A.2d 855, 864 (1969); Telak v. Maszczenski, 248
Md. 476, 487-88, 237 A.2d 434,441 (1968).
64. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 220-21, 321 A.2d 737, 747 (1974)
(doctrine of strict liability has no proper application to liability for design defects in
motor vehicles); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 539, 317 A.2d 494,
505 (1974), vacated on other grounds, 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
65. See cases cited notes 63-64 supra.
66. W. PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS § 98 at 657-58 (4th ed. 1971).
67. See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 6 § 16.A[5][g], at 3-365 to 3-366.
68. Id.
69. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
70. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN. supra note 6, § 16.A[5][g], at 3-365 to 3-368.
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and that it should run from the date of injury. The New York Court of
Appeals expressly rejected the argument that New York law provided a
remedy in strict liability that was wholly independent of any available
remedies for breach of warranty. The court held that the limitations
period applicable to an action for breach of warranty was the six-year
contract limitations period and that the cause of action accrued when
the product was sold even though the one plaintiff who was injured was
only a beneficiary of the warranty and had no connection with the
sale. 7
Mendel therefore does not state, nor does it purport to state, what
limitations period applies to an action in strict liability and when that
period begins to run. The result in Mendel has been the subject of
considerable discussion and criticism,72 the latter largely unfounded.7 3
The majority view is that the concept of strict liability is essentially a
tort concept; that the general statute of limitations applicable to torts
applies to an action for strict liability; and, that the limitations period
runs from the date of injury, and not from the date of sale of the
product.74 However, from a policy standpoint, the rationale for
applying the contract limitations period in actions for breach of
warranty, and for deeming the action to accrue on the date of sale,7" is
equally applicable to actions for strict liability. One of the reasons cited
by the Mendel court for applying the contract limitations period to
actions for breach of warranty was that:
71. 25 N.Y.2d at 344, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493 (1969) (UCC statutory
period inapplicable because sale occurred prior to its effective date in New York).
Subsequent to the Mendel case, the New York Court of Appeals did adopt strict liability
in tort. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 339, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461, 469-70 (1973). And recently, in Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 44 App. Div.
2d 316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654, 663 (1974) the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court held that the three-year tort limitations period commenced to run on the date of
injury.
72. E.g., Comment, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 499 (1970); Note, 11 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV.
1038 (1970); Note, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1308 (1970); Note, 39 FORD. L. REV. 152
(1970); Note, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 413 (1970); 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN. supra note 6,
§ 16A[5][g], at 3-366 to 3-368.
73. What the commentators fail to recognize about Mendel is that the New York Court of
Appeals ruled only that the two warranty counts in the plaintiffs' suit were barred by
limitations. There were two negligence counts that were not subject to a motion to
dismiss since the action was instituted within the required three years for negligence
actions. The plaintiffs were, therefore, permitted to proceed with their action for
negligence. 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495 (1969).
74. E.g., Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Okla. 1974); Hodge v.
Service Machine Co., 438 F.2d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 1971) (applying Tenn. law); Anderson
v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. .Alas. 1971); Giglio v. Connecticut
Light & Power Co., 29 Conn. Supp. 302, 284 A.2d 308, 309 (1971); Holifield v. Setco
Industries, Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 756, 168 N.W.2d 177, 180 (1969); Williams v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125, 131 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 45
Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130,
137, 238 A.2d 169, 176 (1968); Arrow Transp. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp.
170, 172 (D. Ore. 1968).
75. See p. 29 supra.
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An injury resulting from a defective product many years after
it has been manufactured, presumptively at least, is due to
operation and maintenance.76
That position applies with equal force to strict liability and is not
unreasonable, especially since the potential plaintiff will normally still
have a remedy in negligence. It seems fair to circumscribe the period
within which a manufacturer or seller is absolutely liable (liable without
proof of fault) and to condition his liability thereafter only upon a
showing that he has breached some standard of care owed to the
potential plaintiff.
Whatever the appeal of this argument, the adoption of a rule that a
cause of action in strict liability accrues on the date of the sale of the
product would be inconsistent with the rationale underlying the
doctrine of strict liability. The thrust of Section 402A of the
Restatement, 77  and of statutes modeled thereon, is that a plaintiff
whose personal injuries were caused by his use of a product that is
unreasonably dangerous due to the existence of a defect may recover
from the seller or manufacturer without any showing of fault. Under
the terms of the doctrine, liability does not arise until a person has
suffered personal injury as a result of the use of a product. 7' Thus, a
cause of action cannot accrue until injury occurs. Moreover, Comment
M to Section 402A expresses quite clearly the intent of the drafters of
that Section that strict liability is a tort concept and should not be
shackled by contract concepts. From an analytical standpoint, the
argument that a period other than the general tort limitations period
should apply to an action in strict liability makes as little sense as the
argument that the general tort statute of limitations period applies to
an action for breach of a UCC warranty.
Should the Maryland Court of Appeals recognize an independent
cause of action for strict liability, it is altogether likely that the cause of
action will be deemed to accrue on the date of the alleged injury. The
limitations period would be that applicable to other tort actions-the
three-year period prescribed in Section 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated Code.7 9
DISCOVERY RULE
Although it is the general rule that a cause of action accrues when
harm first results from a breach of duty,"° there are some important
exceptions that may apply in the area of product liability. One of these
76. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 346, 253 N.E.2d 207, 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (1969).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
78. Id. § 402A(1).
79. Of course, if the legislature were to adopt strict liaibility, that body could adopt a special
limitations period for that tort.
80. See p. 25-26 and note 10 supra.
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exceptions is the discovery rule. The discovery rule was first articulated
in Maryland, albeit somewhat crudely, in Hahn v. Claybrook, 1
wherein the court of appeals established the concept that a cause of
action for negligence in medical malpractice cases accrues when the
wrong is discovered or should have been discovered. Since the Hahn
opinion, the discovery rule has been consistently extended to all actions
involving forms of professional malpractice. 2
Although no Maryland case has applied the rule in any other
context, 3 one of the concerns that induced the courts to adopt the
discovery rule in the malpractice area is likewise present in certain
product liability actions. That is the fact that the plaintiff, even though
exercising due diligence, may not be able to discover the initial wrong
until after the limitations period has run. 4 For that reason, other
jurisdictions have recently extended the application of the discovery
rule to the product liability area.8 s
In an appropriate case, the discovery rule might save a cause of
action for negligence which would otherwise appear lost due to the
passage of time since the occurrence of some injury. For example,
Thrift v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc.8 6 involved an action by a patient
who was treated for an adverse reaction immediately after an injection
of the drug Thorostrast. Eleven years later it was discovered that the
plaintiff had a thorium granuloma, which he alleged was proximately
caused by the drug. In denying the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, which was brought on the ground that limitations had run,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that the
plaintiff's claims against the manufacturer for negligence and breach of
warranty did not accrue until the plaintiff discovered or should have
discovered the injury.8 7 The district court recognized that the Texas
Supreme Court had theretofore applied the discovery rule only in
foreign object and vasectomy malpractice actions, 8 but divined from
81. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917).
82. E.g., Leonhart v. Atkinson, 265 Md. 219, 224, 289 A.2d 1, 4 (1972) (accountant
malpractice); Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 512, 290 A.2d 530, 533 (1972)
(attorney); Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 94-95, 253 A.2d 904, 908 (1969)
(engineering firm).
83. In Atwell v. Retail Credit Co., 431 F.2d 1008, 1010 n.1 (4th Cir. 1970), Chief Judge
Haynsworth noted that the discovery rule exception for professional malpractice
"cannot fairly be described as a possible opening wedge to a general change" in Maryland
law.
84. The reasons for the discovery rule have been described as follows:
[T]he relation of trust [between professional and client], reliance on
professional expertise, and the likelihood that injury will not occur simultane-
ously with the wrongful act or omission. Id.
85. E.g., Thrift v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 7432, at 13,842 (N.D.
Tex. 1974); Gilbert v. Jones, 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 7350, at 13,524 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1974); Goodman v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 7360, at 13,575
(D.N.J. 1974).
86. 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 7432 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
87. Id. at 13,842-43.
88. Id. at 13,843.
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the Texas case of Hays v. Hall8 9 an indication that Texas would extend
the discovery doctrine to situations where "it is difficult if not
altogether impossible to discover the existence of a legal injury." 90
Concluding that the case before it might meet this criterion9 the court
held that the plaintiff's claim for that injury was not barred.
Goodman v. Mead, Johnson & Co.92 offers an interesting contrast to
the Tenneco case. In Goodman, the plaintiff brought an action against
the manufacturer of the drug Oracon, contending that use of the drug
had caused her to contract thrombophlebitis and cancer. The plaintiff's
last use of the drug was three and one-half years prior to suit; the
applicable period of limitations was two years. The plaintiff contended
that her action was not barred since she had brought suit within two
years of discovery of her illness. The United States District Court for
New Jersey applied the discovery rule but concluded that the plaintiff
was aware of both the fact that she had thrombophlebitis and of the
possible correlation between that condition and the defendant's
allegedly defective drug more than two years prior to suit.93 The court
deemed the date on which the plaintiff discovered the cancer to be
"academic because the New Jersey discovery rule commands that the
date which governs the phlebitis claim also governs the cancer
claim."9 4  Although it was possible that the plaintiff did not know the
full extent of her injuries at the time she discovered the thrombophle-
bitis, the allegedly wrongful act of a defendant gave the plaintiff but
one cause of action on which suit could be maintained. 9
One might hazard a guess that had the Goodman court been faced
with the facts in Tenneco, the plaintiff's claims in the latter case would
also have been barred. It is apparent that the plaintiff in Tenneco was
aware of some injury immediately after the injection of the allegedly
harmful drug, and it is equally apparent that she was aware of a
correlation between the use of the drug and her injury at that time.
One other case in which the discovery rule was applied in a product
liability context is Gilbert v. Jones and Orthropharmaceutical Corp. 96
There, the use of birth control pills brought an action against the
89. 488 S.W.2d 412 (1972) (vasectomy case).
90. Thrift v. Tenneco, 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 7432, at 13,843 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
91. It is interesting to note that in Tenneco, the district court makes express reference to the
fact that the plaintiff suffered, and was treated for, an adverse reaction to the drug
immediately after the injection in 1950. Id. at 13,841. Was he not then aware of the
existence of a legal injury?
92. 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 7360 (D.N.J. 1974).
93. Id. at 13,576.
94. Id.
95. Id. "We find no authority to support the... conclusion that lack of knowledge of the
extent of the injury tolls the running of the statute. Quite to the contrary,... any
wrongful act resulting in an injury to a person, though slight, gives rise to a right to
institute an action and the cause of action accrues at that time." Id., quoting from
Rankin v. Sowinski, 119 N.J. Super., 393, 400, 291 A.2d 849, 853 (App. Div. 1972).
96. 2 CCH PROD. LIAR. REP. 7350 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
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manufacturer of the pills and the prescribing physician for injury (high
blood pressure) allegedly suffered from use of the pills. Although the
discovery rule apparently had been limited previously to professional
malpractice actions in that jurisdiction,9 7 the Court of Appeals of
Tennessee applied the rule to the claims against both the prescribing
physician and the manufacturer of the pills, the latter without
discussion.
While all of the cases discussed involve drugs, one can conceive of
countless situations in which a diligent plaintiff might not become
aware of the fact that he has suffered actionable injury until some time
after the injury actually occurred or was inflicted. Insofar as product
liability cases and malpractice cases are similar in that respect, the
discovery rule should be recognized as a potentially helpful tool in
connection with limitations problems.
However, the differences between a product liability action and a
medical malpractice action should not be overlooked. Perhaps the most
telling distinction is that in a medical malpractice action the wrongdoer
is in a position to know of the injury to the patient whereas in a
product liability action the defendant will frequently be unaware of
any injury." Presumably, knowledge of the injury by the defendant in
the malpractice suit alleviates the unfairness of holding him accountable
for an untimely claim. While at least one court was "unpersuaded" by
this distinction99 it might well be significant to a conservative court
fearful of opening a wedge in prior law.
The discovery doctrine would appear to apply to a strict liability
action to the extent that, and in the manner in which, it would apply to
a product liability action sounding in negligence. On the other hand, it
is clear that even were the discovery rule to be made applicable to
certain product liability actions sounding in tort, it can have no
application to any action for breach of warranty regardless of whether
the claim involves personal injury or simply commercial loss. Sec-
tion 2-725(2) of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code
Annotated explicitly fixes the accrual of a cause of action for breach of
warranty as the time of delivery of the goods "regardless of the
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. " 0 0 That section
provides that the only exceptional instance in which the knowledge of
the aggrieved party is relevant in a warranty action occurs when the
97. Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974).
98. This is particularly true when the defect is alleged to relate to improper assembly or
manufacture as opposed to improper design. Note also that in the typical malpractice
action, there normally exists a confidential relationship which imposes on the
professional the duty to disclose to his client any matter material to the client's interests.
See 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 36 (1951). See also Herring v. Offutt, 266 Md.
593, 597, 295 A.2d 876, 879 (1972). Normally, no such relationship and corresponding
duty is extant in the product liability situation.
99. Thrift v. Tenneco, 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 7432, at 13,843 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
100. MD. ANN. CODE. Comm. L. Art., § 2-725(2) (1975) (emphasis added.)
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warranty in question "explicitly extends to future performance of the
goods."' 1 Thus, whatever viability the discovery rule has in product
liability litigation in Maryland will be confined to actions sounding in
negligence and, perhaps, strict liability in tort.
IGNORANCE OF CAUSE OF
ACTION INDUCED BY FRAUD
As was noted in connection with the discussion of the limitations
period applicable to an action for fraud, 0 2 Section 5-203 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated Code
provides:
If a party is kept in ignorance of a cause of action by the
fraud of an adverse party, the cause of action shall be deemed
to accrue at the time when the party discovered, or by the
exercise of ordinary diligence should have discovered the
fraud. 103
While no Maryland case has applied this statute in a product liability
context, courts in other jurisdictions have so applied similar
statutes.'0 4 Maryland case law makes it clear, however, that the party
relying on the statute to toll the running of the statute of limitations
has the burden of proving the fraudulent concealment.'0 ° In Jones v.
Sugar' 6 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland delineated the
magnitude of that burden as follows:
For fraudulent concealment to be invoked, the replication of
the plaintiff to a plea of limitations must affirmatively show
that the plaintiff was kept in ignorance of his right of action by
the fraud of the defendant, and specifically aver:
(1) How the defendant kept the plaintiff in ignorance of his
right of action; and
101. Id. Cf. Thrift v. Tenneco Chem., Inc., 2 CCH PkoD. LIAa. REP. 7432, at 13,842-4 (N.D.
Tex. 1974); and Goodman v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 2 CCH PROD. LIAR REP. 7360, at
13,575-7 (D.N.J. 1974), where the discovery rule was applied, sub silentio,
to allegations of breach of warranty as well as negligence. In both cases, however, it is
indicated that the UCC limitation provisions had previously been held not applicable to
actions for breach of warranty involving personal injury. Instead, in each case the tort
limitation statute was applied to the warranty counts as well as the tort counts. Thrift v.
Tenneco Chem., Inc., supra at 13,841; Goodman v. Mead, Johnson & Co., supra at
13,574-7.
102. See p. 32-33 supra.
103. MD. ANN. CODE. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 5-203 (1974).
104. A Pennsylvania case applying the fraudulent concealment doctrine in a product liability
action is Hoeflich v. William S. Merrell Co., 288 F. Supp. 659, 661 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
105. See e.g., Jones v. Sugar, 18 Md. App. 99, 101, 305 A.2d 219, 221 (1973).
106. 18 Md. App. 99, 305 A.2d 219 (1973).
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(2) How the plaintiff made the discovery of the fraud; and
(3) Why the plaintiff did not make the discovery sooner than
he did; and
(4) What diligence the plaintiff exercised to discover the
fraud.l17
As one might infer from this test, the fraudulent concealment
exception has proved to be a narrow one. 0 Even assuming a plaintiff
can demonstrate fraudulent concealment, he still carries the heavy
burden of proving how he discovered the fraud and why he did not
make the discovery sooner than he did.'0 9 In the absence of the
existence of a confidential relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant, which will ameliorate to some extent the difficulty of
proof," 0 this burden may well be almost insurmountable. Thus, except
for a very rare case, the provisions of Section 5-203 will not prove to be
of much help to the dilatory plaintiff.
TOLLING
Another aspect of the law of limitations which should not be
overlooked is that represented in Section 5-201 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated Code."' That
Section provides:
Persons under a disability.
(a) Extension of time-When a cause of action subject to a
limitation under Subtitle 1 accrues in favor of a minor or
mental incompetent, that person shall file his action within the
lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after
the date of disability is removed.
(c) Disabilities abolished-Imprisonment, absence from the
state, or marriage are not disabilities which extend the statute
of limitations." 2
107. Id. at 101-02, 305 A.2d at 221.
108. See Mettee v. Boone, 251 Md. 332, 33840, 247 A.2d 390, 394 (1968) Law of March 30,
1868, ch. 357, § 1 [1868] Laws of Md. 646; Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548, 555, 187
A.2d 880, 884 (1963) Law of March 30, 1868, ch. 357, § 1 [1868] Laws of Md. 646;
Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 319, 113 A.2d 919, 924 (1955) Law of March 30, 1868,
ch. 357, § 1 [ 18681 Laws of Md. 646. But see p. 33 and notes 56-60 supra.
109. Mettee v. Boone, 251 Md. 332, 338-39, 247 A.2d 390, 394 (1968); Piper v. Jenkins, 207
Md. 308, 319, 113 A.2d 919, 924 (1955).
110. See Republic Realty Co. v. Phoenix Say. & Loan Ass'n., 250 Md. 549, 558, 243 A.2d
858, 863 (1968):
[A ]bsent a fiduciary relationship, fraud is never presumed ....




As the statute expressly indicates, infancy and mental incompetency
are the only disabilities which will arrest the running of the statute of
limitations." 3 A minor is anyone who has not attained the age of
eighteen years." 4 However, there is little Maryland authority indicating
precisely what is meant by the term "mental incompetent." The
Revisor's Note to Section 5-201 uses the expression "insanity" when
referring to this disability."' Of course, the term "insanity" is no more
susceptible of abstract definition than is "mental incompetent." Since
no Maryland court has had occasion to construe the meaning of either
term in the context of the disability statute, one is left to guess
precisely what meaning the legislature intended the terms to carry.
This predecessor to Section 5-201(a)" 6 employed the term "non
compos mentis" instead of the term "mental incompetent." There is
some Maryland authority construing "non compos mentis," albeit in
another context. In Purdum v. Lilly, ' for example, the Maryland
Court of Appeals stated:
Under the generic legal term, non compos mentis is compre-
hended every species of mental derangement which incapaci-
tates a man from assenting to, or making a legal contract." 8
The definition given "non compos mentis" in the Purdum case must
presently suffice as the only Maryland guideline for determining what
constitutes the disability of mental incompetency. On the other hand,
there is considerable discussion of the meaning of insanity in this
context in other jurisdictions." 9 In Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons,'2 ° for
example, the word "insane" in the tolling section of the New Jersey
statute of limitations was interpreted to include, inter alia, a temporary
mental incapacity to protect one's rights resulting from a physical
injury. 12 1
Aside from the definitional difficulties, there are other obstacles to
invoking the tolling statutes. Whether the alleged disability be infancy
113. Hogan v. Stumper, 257 Md. 520, 521, 263 A.2d 571-72 (1970) (construing predecessor
of 5-201(c), Law of April 6, 1894, ch. 661, § 6A [1894] Laws of Md. 1059); Rettaliata
v. Sullivan, 208 Md. 617, 622, 119 A.2d 420, 422 (1956) (construing ch. 661, § 6A
[ 1894] Laws of Md. 1059).
114. MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 24 (1973).
115. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 5-201, Revisor's Note, p. 183 (1974).
116. Law of April 6, 1894, ch. 661, § 6A [1894] Laws of Md..1059.
117. 182 Md. 612, 35 A.2d 805 (1944).
118. Id. at 618, 35 A.2d at 808 (quoting from Owing's Case, 1 Bland 370, 385 (High Ct. of
Chancery 1826)).
119. E.g., Hurd v. County of Allegany, 39 App. Div. 2d 499, 502-03, 336 N.Y.S.2d 952,
956-57 (1972); Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons, 108 N.J. Super. 99, 104, 260 A.2d 228,
231-32 (1969).
120. 108 N.J. Super. 99, 260 A.2d 228 (1969).
121. Id. at 104, 260 A.2d at 231. Even this definition leaves much room for speculation. For
example, would a coma caused by a third person's negligence qualify as insanity? Would
retrograde amnesia qualify as insanity?
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or mental incompetency, it must exist when the cause of action
accrues; once the statute has begun to run, "no subsequent disability
will arrest it.' 22 Secondly, by the express terms of the Section, the
disabilities created in Section 5-201 apply only to those causes of
action subject to a limitation under Subtitle one of the Arti-
cle. 2 3 While Subtitle one includes the three-year catch-all period
contained in Section 5-101,24 it does not include the statute of
limitations applicable to an action for breach of warranty. As noted
above, that statute of limitations is contained in Section 2-725 of the
Maryland UCC.12' Accordingly, the disabilities set forth in Sec-
tion 5-201 do not apply to an action for breach of warranty.1 26
WRONGFUL DEATH
Since death, as well as injury, is occasionally the unfortunate
consequence of the use of defective products, some discussion of the
provisions of Maryland's Wrongful Death Statute' 27 and the limitations
period contained therein is appropriate.
Historically, no cause of action existed at common law for wrongful
death. 128 In 1852, however, the Maryland legislature adopted.29 what
has been recognized as "almost a literal transcript of the English
122. Maurice v. Worden, 52 Md. 283, 295 (1879). What if a person injured by another's
negligent act goes into a comatose state a few days after the injury-producing
occurrence? Will the running of the statute be tolled? Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona,
Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 106, 207 A.2d 513, 519 (1965) (condition of "insanity" which
developed a short time after occurrence held sufficient to toll running of statute, even
though condition did not actually arise until after cause of action accrued).
123. MD. ANN. CODE. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § § 5-101 to 5-304 (1974) sets forth various
limitation periods applicable to certain enumerated causes of action. In Redfern v.
Holtite Mfg. Co., 209 Md. 106, 111, 120 A.2d 370, 372 (1956), the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that the predecessor of Section 5-201(c), Law of April 6, 1894, ch. 661
§ 6A [ 1894] Laws of Md. 1059, had no application to claims for Workmen's Compen-
sation:
[The statute] is in terms limited t9 the causes of action specified in that
Article.
124. MD. ANN. CODE. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 5-101 (1974). This, of course, includes
negligence, fraud and, perhaps, strict liability if it is ever adopted in this state.
125. Note 17 supra.
126. See Redfern v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 209 Md. 106, 111, 120 A.2d 370, 372 (1956) and note
123 supra. While this result may appear at first to be inadvertent, it is arguably not the
result of legislative oversight. It may well be that the failure to extend the disability
provision of Section 5-201 to actions for breach of warranty is further evidence of the
legislature's intention that UCC "sellers" be exposed to the form of absolute liability
created by the UCC for a period of four years from the date of sale and no more-no
matter what the circumstances. See p. 29 supra. On the other hand, if this be the case, it
is difficult to appreciate the need for Subsection four of Section 2-725 of the Maryland
UCC, which provides:
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of
limitations.... MD. ANN. CODE. Comm. L. Art., § 2-725(4) (1975).
127. MD. ANN. CODE. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § § 3-901 to 3-904 (1974).
128. Zitomer v. State, 21 Md. App. 709, 715, 321 A.2d 328, 331 (1974).
129. Law of May 25, 1852, ch. 299, 1-4, 1852 Laws of Md. The successor to this enactment is
now codified in MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., 3-901 to 904 (1974).
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Statute-known as the 'Lord Campbell's Act' "130-which altered the
common law rule to permit recovery for wrongful death in certain
circumstances. The present version of Maryland's "Lord Campbell's
Act"'1 3' provides a right of action in certain designated persons for
damages for the death of another when that death is caused by a
"wrongful act." ' 3 2
A wrongful act is defined as:
[A]n act, neglect, or default including a felonious act which
would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and
recover damages if death had not ensued.' 33
An action for wrongful death must be commenced within three years
after the death of the injured person.'3 4 Thus, the Wrongful Death Act
creates a cause of action, fixes the date when that cause of action shall
accrue and fixes the period after the date of accrual within which the
suit must be brought.
The provisions of the Act are, perhaps, best suited for application to
negligence actions.' 3' The limitations period for negligence is the same
as that for wrongful death (three years) 136 and a cause of action for
wrongful death based on negligence will normally accrue on or about
the same time that an action for negligence would have accrued had the
injured person not died.'"
While the limitations period applicable to a cause of action for fraud
is likewise three years, 1 38 the accrual date of an action for fraud is
likely to differ from the date on which a death action accrues.' 39 Thus,
the possibility that a wrongful death action for the death of the
deceased based on fraud will exist after the fraud limitations period has
expired is probably greater than the same possibility where negligence is
concerned. At the same time, a wrongful death action based on fraud is
rare and this potential accrual problem is unlikely to become a reality.
130. State v. B.&O. R.R., 126 Md. 497, 501, 95 A. 65, 67 (1915).
131. MD. ANN. CODE. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-904 (1974).
132. Id. § 3-902(a).
133. Id. § 3-901(e).
134. Id. § 3-904(f). The period was formerly two years but it was changed in 1971 to "bring
the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions in uniformity with other negligence
actions."
135. The Act is also suited for application to strict liability if and when it becomes the law in
this state.
136. See p. 24 and note 5 supra.
137. As noted at p. 25-26 supra, a cause of action for negligence normally accrues on the date
of injury. Of course, if a person is injured and "lingers" for a period before dying, the
time at which a negligence action accrued in his favor and the time at which a wrongful
death action accrues in favor of his relative may differ considerably. Indeed, were the
injured person to linger for more than three years, his negligence action might be barred
whereas on his death, his relatives would have three years within which to bring an
action.
138. See p. 32 and note 50 supra.
139. See pp. 32-33 supra.
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The most difficult problem with the application of the Wrongful
Death Act arises when a death allegedly results from a breach of
warranty. A threshold question, not yet decided in this jurisdiction, is
whether a breach of warranty can serve as the basis for a wrongful
death action at all. The answer depends on whether a breach of
warranty is a "wrongful act" within the meaning of the statute. The
cases from other jurisdictions that have construed statutes similar to
Maryland's are not in agreement on this point.
40
Assuming, arguendo, that a breach of a UCC warranty constitutes a
"wrongful act," the application of the wrongful death statute of
limitations could lead to some bizzare results. As noted above, the
period of limitations for a breach of warranty is four years and the
period commences to run on the date of the sale of the product in
question.' 4 ' Thus, assuming one were to purchase a product in 1980
and suffer an injury in 1985 as a result of a defect in the product a
cause of action for breach of warranty would be time-barred. However,
if the occurrence in 1985 resulted in death instead of mere injury, those
persons designated in the wrongful death statute would have three years
from the date of the death in which to institute a death action based on
the same breach of warranty for which the deceased could not have
sued.142 Even assuming that it was the intention of the legislature to
provide an action for wrongful death based on a breach of warranty, it
is difficult to imagine that such an anamoly was anticipated.
CONCLUSION
A thorough understanding of the statutes of limitations is particu-
larly important in the area of product liability litigation. It is essential
140. Compare the following cases, all of which hold that a wrongful death action is not
maintainable on a theory of breach of warranty, e.g., Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 480
F.2d 158, 159 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Ga. law); Home v. Armstrong Prod. Corp., 416
F.2d 1329, 1330 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying Ga. law); Mascuilli v. U.S., 411 F.2d 872 (3d
Cir. 1969) (applying Pa. law); Sterling Aluminum Prod., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d
801, 804 (8th Cir. 1944) (applying Mo. law), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 761 (1944); Knight
v. Collins, 327 F. Supp. 97, 98 (N.D. Ala. 1971) (action for breach of contract without
"warranty" language); Necktas v. General Motors Corp., 357 Mass. 546, 549, 259 N.E.2d
234, 236 (1970); Goelz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Institute & Blood Bank, 350
S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Goodwin v. Misticos, 207 Miss. 361, 42 So. 2d
397, 398 (1949) (dictum), with, e.g., Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis.2d 345, 358,
195 N.W.2d 602, 609 (1972), reh. denied, 54 Wis. 2d 345, 198 N.E.2d 161 (1972);
Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hospital, 23 Ill. 2d 326, 334, 178 N.E.2d 303, 307
(1961) (action for breach of contract without "warranty" language); Greco v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 27, 12 N.E.2d 557, 561-62 (1938), all holding that a wrongful
death action is maintainable on theory of breach of warranty.
141. See pp. 29-31 and notes 17-19, 24-36 supra.
142. While, as noted above, p. 44 and notes 135-139 supra, similar results might occur in
connection with death actions based on negligence, fraud or strict liability, they are more
likely to occur where breach of warranty is the basis of the death action since the date of
accrual of an action for breach of warranty will almost always differ from the date on
which a cause of action for wrongful death based on the same warranty would accrue.
The only instance in which both causes of action would accrue at the same time is where
death resulting from a breach of warranty occurs on the date of sale.
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to the plaintiff who desires to maintain all available options for
recovery. In many cases, the availability of more than one remedy for
the same injury will prove crucial. Likewise, limitations can be a
devastating tool in the arsenal of the defense attorney, if he is aware of
the different statutes, the manner in which they are applied and the
rationale for the manner of application.
Recognition of every conceivable limitations problem posed by a
particular case is difficult. The need for a comprehensive legislative
review of limitations statutes as applied to product liability litigation is
illustrated by the facts that, currently, the limitations applicable to
negligence, breach of warranty, and wrongful death are contained in
different statutes; the period of the statute applicable to breach of
warranty differs from the periods applicable to negligence, fraud and
wrongful death; and the statutes applicable to negligence, fraud, breach
of warranty and wrongful death all commence running on different
dates. Until a legislative review is undertaken, however, the product
liability attorney faced with a statute of limitations problem can rely
on only a handful of seemingly irreconcileable statutes, scant Maryland
case law and his own vivid imagination.
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